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"There  is... no transhistorical  criterion  for 'thinking like a... lawyer,' other than an
abiding  faith in the basic constitutional  enterprise.  "I
Is  the  Constitution  of the  United  States  a  sort of thing that anyone  in this
country,  acting  individually,  can  choose  to  reject?  In  what sense?  With  what
consequence?  What is it that one does, takes on, or enters into by "acceptance"  of
the  Constitution,  either  by  a  public  act  (say,  an  oath),  or  in  focused,  private
thought?  And what, exactly  is the  Constitution, regarded  as a possible  object of
personal  commitment?  Sanford  Levinson  takes  up these  questions  in his  book
Constitutional Faith. 2  Below,  in  Parts  II  and  IV,  I  engage  in  a  dissection  of
Levinson's  treatments  of  them-committing,  no  doubt,  the  offense  that
Kierkegaard wincingly  called  "slic[ing]  the author into paragraphs  .... I do so
not idly, however, but prompted  by questions  arising from other work  in which I
recently have been engaged,4 so let us begin with that.
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL  OBLIGATION
A.  The Constitution  as Law and as a Basis of Obligation
The Constitution, no doubt, is many things to many people.  To all, however,
it is law (whatever else it also may be), and it's as law that we shall regard it here.5
The  Constitution  could  not conceivably  have  figured  as  it  has  in  our country's
history, and as it  does in our lives today, had it not from the start and throughout
been widely  perceived  as a body of legal norms, compliance  and  non-compliance
with which carry  pivotal  legal consequences  within our particular system of legal
*  Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1.  Paul  Brest,  Sanford  Levinson,  J.M.  Balkin  &  Akhil  Reed  Amar,  Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking:  Cases and Materials xxxi (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
2.  Sanford Levinson, Constitutional  Faith (Princeton U. Press 1988).
3.  See  Soren  Kierkegaard,  Fear and  Trembling-Preface, in  Soren  Kierkegaard,  Fear and
Trembling and the Sickness unto Death 22, 24 (Walter Lowrie trans., Princeton U. Press 1954).
4.  See e.g. Frank  I.  Michelman,  The  Constitution as Legitimation Contract,  8  Rev.  Constitutional
Stud. - (forthcoming 2003).
5.  See  e.g.  Levinson,  supra n.  2,  at  54  (calling  the  Constitution  "the  very  fountainhead  of  the
American  legal system").
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ordering.  No decree  can count as  valid  law here  if it  visibly issues  from  outside
constitutionally  authorized  institutions  and  procedures,  or  otherwise  fails  to
6 comply  with  constitutional  requirements.  We  can  grant  that  judgments  of
constitutionality  do not always entirely settle  questions of civic obligation.  There
sometimes  may  be  prevailing  reasons-even  reasons  of civic  responsibility-to
break  evil  laws  you  consider constitutional;  just as there  also  sometimes  may  be
prevailing  civic  (or other) reasons to abide  by evil  laws you think are not.7  But if
judgments  of  constitutionality  are  not  always  strictly  decisive  of  civic  duties
respecting  the  law,  they surely  often are  and surely  always have  a  bearing.  Else
what's a Constitution for?8
The premise  that  the Constitution  is  law leaves open some  huge  questions.
That premise  does  not settle  whether  the corpus  of normative  material of which
the  Constitution  is  composed,  from  which  its  applied  meanings  are  to  be
expounded as occasion requires, consists of the parchment  text alone or that plus a
surrounding  interpretive  tradition,  perhaps  viewed  through  a  scrim  of  truths
evident  to reason.  The former  is  what  Levinson  calls  a  "protestant,"  the  latter
what  he calls a  "catholic"  view.9  Nor, if we  follow  Levinson, does  the premise  of
the-constitution-as-law  settle who does the expounding.  It does not settle whether
I, when in  doubt, am  to learn the concrete  requirements of constitutional  legality
from  what  some  hierarchically  paramount,  central  authority  from  time  to  time
declares  them to be  (a  "catholic"  view), or rather I am to learn  them by applying
to the case my own relevant powers of research  and reason  (a "protestant"  view). 1 0
The  fact  remains that most American  minds  posit something identifiable  as
the  Constitution,  conditioning  someone's  legally  potent  judgments  of
constitutionality  and  unconstitutionality.  Suppose  we  adopt  a  "catholic-
protestant" stance, as Levinson does."  We take an  expansive, non-literalist, "text-
plus"  view  of  interpretative  method,  while  insisting  on  every  individual's
6.  In the lingo of jurisprudence, the Constitution  acts in our legal system as a "secondary  rule" and
"rule  of  recognition."  See  H.L.A.  Hart,  The  Concept of Law  89-107  (Oxford  U.  Press  1961);
Michelman, supra n. 4,  at pt. II(B).  Perhaps the  Constitution-as-law  has not at every moment  from its
birth  figured clearly  as  a recognition-rule  in  the American  legal system.  See  Larry  D.  Kramer,  The
Supreme Court,  2000 Term-Foreword:  We the Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 4,  5-33  (2001)  (distinguishing
between the Constitution  as "fundamental"  law and the Constitution as  "supreme,"  "ordinary"  law).  It
has done  so steadily, however, for a very long time.
7.  See e.g. John  Rawls, A  Theory of Justice 320-23  (rev. ed., Belknap Press of Harv. U. Press  1999)
(discussing  "civil disobedience"  as distinguished  from "conscientious refusal").
8.  I do not mean to suggest that constitutions as  a class have  no other or broader purpose  or effect
than  to  settle  certain  questions  of  legal  validity  or  of civic  obligation.  See  e.g.  Cass  R.  Sunstein,
Designing Democracy: What  Constitutions Do 6  (Oxford  U.  Press  2001)  ("[T]he  central  goal  of  a
constitution is to create the preconditions for a well-functioning democratic order .... ").  I do  mean to
suggest that constitutions could not very well serve those other purposes, or have those other effects, if
they did not also figure as law.
9.  Levinson, supra n. 2,  at 18-19,  47.  I will sometimes  refer to the "catholic"  view  as a  "text-plus"
view.
10.  See  id. at  23-27.  There  are  also,  of course,  less  radically  individualist  non-catholic  views  to
consider:  that  constitutional  interpretive  authority  belongs  to  the  people  collectively  (a  "Quaker"
view?), or to sundry heads of governmental  districts and departments to work out among themselves  as
best they can (an  "episcopal"  view?).
11.  Id. at 51; see id. at47.
[Vol.  38:651
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responsibility  to  use  that method  to  reach  his or  her  own judgments  regarding
constitutionality.  This need not mean we feel free to obstruct enforcement  of any
judicial  ruling on constitutionality with which we disagree.  It does mean we won't
allow judicial rulings automatically  to displace  our own judgments, or in that way
to  saturate  our  understandings  of  civic  obligation.12  In  our  eyes,  issues  of
constitutionality  obviously  remain  both  serious  and  legal.  They  are  serious
inasmuch  as we  conceive  the contents of people's  civic  obligations to  depend  on
them  significantly. 3  They  are  legal  inasmuch  as  we  demand  that  anyone
purporting to decide  them  do so by honest attempts to discern and  apply the law
of  the  Constitution.  "[R]ejection  of  institutional  authority,"  the  Levinsonian
protestant takes  pains to  insist, "is  not ...  the  equivalent  of ...  rejection of the
binding authority of the Word (or Law) itself."' 4
We speak of effects  on people's civic obligations, but what sort of effect have
we  in view?  Suppose there  is some act, or process, or form of concentration  of the
mind,  by  which  an  inhabitant  of the  United  States  can  be  said  to  "accept"  or
"reject"  the Constitution.  (Constitutional Faith, as we'll  see in  Part  II, is  reared
upon the conceit that there  is, and not just for immigrants and office-takers.)  One
gives  the  Constitution  the  once-over,  let  us  say,  finds  it  up  to  snuff  as  far  as
constitutions  go,  and says,  in effect, "Okay,  let's run  with it."  A commitment of
some  kind  apparently  will  have  been  made  (otherwise  what's  the  point?),  but
exactly  what  sort of commitment?  Is "accepting"  the  Constitution  like signing  a
contract?  Does one thereby impose on oneself any new restriction  on one's future
freedom of action, or even  of judgment regarding  the moral  status  of actions you
or others might take?  Can "acceptance"  of the Constitution  have any such effect,
if  one  holds  a  Levinsonian  "protestant"  view  of  where  the  authority  lies  to
construe the Constitution?
B.  Legitimacy
The  question  of the  obligations  one  assumes  by  "signing"  one's  country's
constitution  is  maddeningly  elusive  and  complex,  and  I  want  to  isolate  for
consideration  here  a single strand of it on which I have  found Constitutional  Faith
to  shed  a  particular  light.  In  order  to  get  that  strand  in  focus,  we'll  need  to
introduce  the notion of normative political legitimacy.
Very briefly:15  As Levinson notes, drily  but not disapprovingly, "the  state is
,,16
usually  interested  in  imposing  notions  of  obligation  upon  everyone  ....
12.  This,  famously,  was  Abraham  Lincoln's  view,  specifically  as  directed  to  the  decision  of  the
Supreme  Court  in  Dred Scott  v.  Sandford, 60  U:S.  393  (1857).  See  e.g.  The  Collected Works  of
Abraham Lincoln vol.  II, at 494-96 (Roy P. Basler ed., Rutgers  U. Press 1953)  (Speech at Chicago, Ill.,
July 10, 1858).
13.  See infra pt. II(B).
14.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 25.  Levinson adds: "Instead,  the most radical protestant might hold, it is
up to each  member of the faith  community..,  to decide  what the Word actually  requires."  Id. at 25-
26.
15.  I have drawn what follows substantially from Michelman, supra n. 4.
16.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 113.
20031
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Governments  demand  compliance with their laws and use force, when needed, to
secure  it.  Questions  arise  as  to  whether  anyone  ever  has  a  morally  justified
complaint  about such uses  of force  by the government,  and  the answers often  are
said to depend on the "legitimacy"  of the laws  in question or of the governmental
regime that seeks to effectuate them.17
It seems  that to judge a  law (in  this sense) legitimate,  one  need not judge it
right, or just, or morally  blameless, or a work  in which the maker can  take pride.
One  can judge the  law  unjust and  badly  misguided,  and nevertheless  legitimate.
One  can  do so  insofar  as one  judges respect-worthy-worth  having,  supporting,
and  preserving-the  entire  governmental  system,  or practice,  that produced  the
law,  despite that system's having  produced  the bad  law and  maybe others  as bad
or worse.  (The ability combined with the willingness to make such affirmative  but
troubled judgments  turns  out,  I believe,  to be much  of what  Levinson  means by
"constitutional  faith.''5)  The core idea is that if the system taken whole is respect-
worthy, worth  upholding, then  the state  is, so to speak,  within its rights enforcing
every law that issues from the system, including even those that  you or I or Judge
Whosis may consider to be very bad and immoral ones. 9
It  is  no  mystery  why  you  or  I  might  be  disposed  to  think  this  way.  Our
political culture  is one  in which  people  associate  certain  commanding  moral  and
other  practical  goods  with  the  practice  of  positive  legal  ordering,  or  call  it
government by law  (or by democracy).  Government by law prevails to the extent
that  inhabitants  of  a  country  are  predominantly  disposed:  (a)  to  conform  their
conduct  to rules and principles pronounced  to be law there by some distinct class
or classes of  officials,  (b)  to  organize  their activities with  a view  to  compatibility
with such official pronouncements, and (c) to support, or at least to accept, the use
of  social  force  to  secure  compliance  in  general  with  such  pronouncements.
Government  by  law,  people  feel  certain,  can  carry  with  it,  for  everyone,
inestimable goods of social coordination,  pacification, and justice20-and  let us not
fail to include the communitarian  good of respect for and cooperation with fellow
citizens  engaged  in  democratic  processes  of lawmaking. 21  People further  believe
that achievement  of these goods will not be possible,  unless  laws issuing from an
17.  See e.g. Allen  Buchanan,  Political  Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 Ethics  689,  691-692  (2002).
We speak here, of course, of "legitimacy"  in its normative,  not its descriptive sense.  See id. at 689.
18.  See infra pt. II(C).
19.  Some may say the  case  I have just posited  is an impossibility,  because  a  regime  that insists  on
enforcing  laws  that  really are  immoral  is  ipso facto incapable  of deserving  respect.  I offer  no  case
against  such  a view.  My  claim is only  that whoever  holds it  has no  use for  the notion  of legitimacy.
Legitimacy,  by  my  understanding,  is  a  concept  that  finds  breathing  space  only within  a  scheme  of
thought allowing that people in a state can be justified in supporting the state's enforcement  of bad and
immoral laws.
20.  This conviction flows from Kantian as well as  Hobbesian inspirations.  See Jeremy Waldron, The
Dignity of Legislation 36-62  (Cambridge  U.  Press  1999);  Immanuel  Kant, Metaphysical Elements of
Justice: Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals § 42  (John  Ladd  trans.,  2d  ed., Hackett  Publg. Co.,  Inc.
1999); Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan chs. 13-17  (Michael Oakeshott  ed., Collier Books 1962)  (1651).
21.  See Jeremy Waldron,  Law and Disagreement  100 (Clarendon  Press 1999)  ("[T]he  demand that
interests me ...  is  a  demand  for a  certain  sort of recognition  and ...  respect-that this, for the time
being, is what the community  has come up with  and that it should  not be ignored or disparaged simply
because some  of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.").
[Vol. 38:651.
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on-the-whole  respect-worthy,  on-the-whole  democratic  political  system  are
considered  generally  binding on everyone,  regardless  of any individual's  opinion
of  a  given  law's  merit  or  justice 2   Accordingly,  as  long  we  believe  the
governmental  system,  on  the  whole,  to  be  democratically  respect-worthy,  we
will-at  any  rate,  we  can-believe  that  a  general,  presumptive  commitment  to
enforcement  of every  law  issuing from  it  is justified.  (Note  that  this  is not the
same  as  saying  anyone  has  even  a  presumptive  moral  obligation  to comply  with
every  law.23  A  pacifist  patriot  can,  with  perfect  logical  consistency,  reject  any
moral  obligation  on  his  part  to  comply  with  military-service  orders  while
conceding  that  the  government  is  justified  in  demanding  compliance  and
punishing non-compliance  . 2 4)
For good reason, then, we want to be  a country governed  by law.  That want
ensnares  us, inevitably,  in  a  mobilization  of coercion  upon  all to comply  with all
formally  valid acts of lawmaking  and legal interpretation,  regardless  of what any
individual may think of the moral and other merits of any given  law.  For that, we
want justification, and "legitimacy"  is its name.  "Legitimate"  is what you plead in
response to a fellow-citizen's  complaint against compulsion to comply with  a legal
act that  he believes  to be wrong on the merits and  you cannot demonstrate  to be
right and  maybe are not at all sure  is right.  In making  the plea, you  do not take
yourself off the hook for supporting enactment of a wrong and bad law (supposing
you did support it). You only take yourself off the hook for supporting compulsion
against him to comply with the law-which, presumably, you do out of respect for
the moral  and  other practical goods  of the general  social  venture  of government
by law and for the sake  of that venture's success.  But of course you cannot stake
anything on the venture's success  if you do not find respect-worthy,  on the whole,
the particular system of government by law that is in force in your country.
At this  point, we  can  state  with  middling  precision  the  question  regarding
political obligation on which  I have  found Constitutional  Faith to shed a particular
light, even though Levinson does  not ever raise  it in anything  like my terms.  By
"accepting"  the Constitution,  does one obligate oneself never to count as  a black
mark  against the  respect-worthiness  of American  government  the  enactment  or
enforcement  of  any  law  (or  legal  interpretation)  that  is  not  unconstitutional?
Does one, in effect,  subscribe  to the Constitution  as a kind of public contract-a
publicly binding statement of the  terms of a political  association that citizens  are
morally justified in supporting, using whatever force  those terms permit to secure
compliance with laws enacted in accordance with them?
For  reasons  I  explain  partly  below,25  I  had  come  to  doubt  that  the
Constitution's  place  in  our  lives  and  politics  is  best  understood  in  such  a
22.  See  e.g. The  Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol.  1, at  112-13  (Roy  B.  Basler ed.,  1953
Rutgers  U. Press) (Address Before  the Young Men's  Lyceum of Springfield, I11.,  Jan. 27,  1838).
23.  See Buchanan, supra n.  17, at 693-95.
24.  Cf  Wesley  Newcomb  Hohfeld,  Some  Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
25.  See infra pt. III.
2003]
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contractualist  frame.  My  recent  revisitation  to  Levinson's book,  undertaken  for
this  symposium,  has  led  me  to  reconsider  my  doubt,  although  not  finally  to
withdraw it.  The doubt surely holds-I maintain-if we take a "catholic"  view of
the social  organization  of constitutional-interpretative  authority.  Does it  hold if
we take up a "protestant"  stance?  My answer will be that it does, but for different
reasons.
26
Having  put  my  concerns  on  the  table,  I  turn  now  to  a  short  tour  of
Levinson's book.
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
If what  I  have  said  so far is  right, we  all  have  reason  to concern  ourselves
with  the  question  of  the  respect-worthiness  of  our  country's  system  of
government,  on  which  depends  the presumptive  legitimacy of the laws that issue
from  that  system  and,  with  it,  the  justification  of our  own  collaboration  in  the
subjection of everyone to pressure to comply with every one of those laws, right or
wrong.  Constitutional Faith fairly  may  be  read  as  a  disquisition  on  what,  if
anything, the  Constitution has  to do with judgments of the  respect-worthiness  of
the American system of government.
A.  Constitutional  "Attachment" and Personal  Identity: A Distraction?
The time is late in the 1980s; the place the historic house of the Second Bank
of  United  States  in Philadelphia;  the  occasion  a  public  display  by  the  National
Park Service of the original, parchment  charter styled "Constitution  of the United
States of America."  The Park Service also  has placed on  the site two scrolls, as if
to  represent  white  space  at the  foot  of the  original parchment,  open to  further
signatures.21  Visitors to the shrine-the Service named  its bicentennial exhibition
"Miracle  in  Philadelphia" 2 _-not  only  thus are invited  to add  their names  to the
list  of  subscribers  to  the  Constitution,  they  are  explicitly  challenged  by  the
exhibitors with the question whether they "'will"' or will not do so.29
In  Constitutional  Faith, Sanford  Levinson  recalls the scene and in  it himself,
pondering  this  unsought-for  choice  whether  to  "ratify"  or  "reject"  the
Constitution.3°  Now Sandy, as I'll call this character in Levinson's book, figures as
312 a sort of Everyman."  Sandy is us, Levinson's tuned-in readers.32  If we  had been
there, would we have signed?
3 3
26.  See infra pt. IV.
27.  See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 180.
28.  See id.
29.  Id.
30.  Id.
31.  Throughout, I'll use  "Sandy"  to refer to character  who sweats  the do-I-sign-or-don't-I  question
at the Philadelphia  exhibit,  and  "Levinson"  to refer to the chronicler-analyst  author of Constitutional
Faith.
32.  Levinson  addresses  "highly  self-conscious  persons  willing  to  engage in"  the sort  of reflection
that he recounts in his book.  Id. at 184.
33.  Levinson, supra n. 2, at 180.
[Vol. 38:651
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Why worry?  What risk if we don't?  What risk if we do?
Start with  if we don't.  If we  are foreign born and seeking citizenship, refusal
ever to "sign"  the Constitution  obviously carries a heavy price.  Sandy, however, is
native born and  "Miracle  in Philadelphia"  is not a  naturalization ceremony.  It is
true that when Levinson turns in his book to explaining and defending the practice
of  requiring  would-be  citizens  from  abroad  to  declare  support  for  the
Constitution, he does so  in terms that potentially apply to everyone here, not just
to  those  who  arrive  from  offshore.  It's  a  big  country,  he  notes,  inhabited  by
people  who are  "strangers"  to  one  another  and consequently  need  some  way  to
know which of their neighbors they can "count on...  to have agreed on a minimal
common  way  of life  ....  ,34  Vows can  provide  the requisite  signal.  "Vows...
signify  . . . a  willingness  to  remain  within  [the]  boundaries"  set by  a  particular
community.35
Doubtless  these signaling functions  of oaths are useful  and important  ones.
However, they cannot be what make Sandy sweat in Philadelphia.  I mean, picture
Sandy, pen  in hand,  hesitating  before  those  Park Service  scrolls.  Is he  worried
that, if he doesn't sign, the  absence of his name  from the  lists might  be noticed?
Its  absence,  along  with  the  missing  names  of  two-hundred-odd  million  fellow
citizens  who  also have not signed, might tarnish his  reputation for  Americanism?
Please.
Very well.  What do we risk if we do sign?  The question, of course, assumes
that we  take the affair seriously.  We don't just dismiss the exhibitors'  invitation as
"trivial  gimmickry,"36 or  our  "signing"  as  a  meaningless  formality,  as  Levinson
reports some of his students do when they sign a statement put before them by bar
examiners,  pledging  them  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  a  Code  of  Professional
Responsibility that in fact they never have read.37  To the contrary, one is not, on
Levinson's stipulation, to sign  unless one then and  there believes  that the  system
of  governance  currently  carried  on  in  the  Constitution's  name  is  "sufficiently
protective of liberty and helpful to achieving justice that it deserves ...  support., 3
1
So there we glimpse  something that one plainly does risk or commit by signing-
that is, one's opinion, then and there, that the Constitution one signs is in that way
"worthy of respect. 3 9  But then what, after all, is the risk?  That one  will sign and
be mistaken?  That one may at some later time be caught out, if only by oneself, in
an error of speculative judgment?  An academic's greatest  fear, perhaps?  Maybe
34.  Id. at 119.
35.  Id. at 99.  Levinson  extends the thought to the oaths prescribed  by the Constitution  for those
assuming judicial and other offices.  He recalls approvingly the view of the early, eminent Pennsylvania
judge,  John  Bannister  Gibson,  who  was  taking  issue  with John  Marshall's  reasoning  in  Marbury  v.
Madison when  he  remarked  that  the judicial  oath  is not  so  much  designed  to  bind  the taker  to an
obligation  as to provide "'a test of the political principles of the man'  to whom we are about to entrust
a  share  of the power  to govern  us.  Id. at  122  (emphasis omitted)  (quoting  Eakin v.  Raub, 12  S & R.
330, 353  (Pa. 1825)  (Gibson, J., dissenting)).  See Marbury v.  Madison, 5 U.S. 137,  178, 180 (1803).
36.  Levinson, supra n. 2, at 182.
37.  Id. at 183.
38.  Id. at 191.
39.  Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).
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for some, but not for Sanford Levinson.  To shrink  from that risk would surely, in
his view, be a betrayal of our calling as academics.
As  Levinson  would  have  it,  Sandy  before  the  scrolls  is  being  tested  for
something  other and  more than  his good  or bad judgment,  morals,  or taste  as  a
constitution-appraiser.  He is being tested for faith.  Sandy faces, in  a way, the test
of his  life,  because  the outcome-so Levinson  suggests-carries  with  it  the news
that Sandy  is or is not, if not exactly among  the saved, then at any rate  among the
faithful and even, in a sense that is not entirely facetious, the elect.  Under test are
Sandy's faith and along with it his identity, the very stuff of the self.  "Our answer.
is... a sign of our willingness to join in affirming a 'constitutional faith  ....
That faith, in turn, or the lack of it, is a sign of "membership," or the lack of it, in a
"particular  community.",41  Thus,  in  signing  or  not  signing,  one  gains  or  loses
"everything,  i.e.,  one's  true  identity  as  a  member-or  rejector-of  a  peculiar
American fellowship.,
42
Behold,  then,  Sandy,  poised  achingly  at  the  chasm. 43  Will  I  sign  or not?
Have I faith or not?  Am I American or not?
Can  all  this really be  at stake?  On what ground  does Levinson suggest  it is
or might be?  On the ground that American identity-or "the notion" thereof-is
peculiar among national  identities in having  an "ideological  nature.' "4  (Is  this an
oddly essentialist claim to be emanating from the likes of Levinson?45)  According
to  this  view,  which  Levinson  attributes  to  such  widely  assorted  authorities  as
Samuel  P. Huntington46 and  Frances Wright,4 7 national  identity  for  Americans  is
not, as  it  is for other peoples, a complex, historically  evolved product of common
ancestry,  experience,  ethnicity,  language,  and  culture.  It  is simply  and  only  a
matter  of  "espousal"  of  a  certain  "creed" 48-one  that  is  identified  with  the
Constitution,  or  is  deemed  to  be  contained  in  it.
49   America  is  a  "faith
40.  Id. at 180-81.
41.  Levinson, supra n. 2,  at 184.
42.  Id.
43.  I echo Robert Cover's words describing Abraham with  Isaac at Mount Moriah-not the Bible's
Abraham,  it needs  to  be said, but  Kierkegaard's.  See  Robert M.  Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery
and the Judicial  Process 4 (Yale U. Press 1975).  On the Cover-Levinson connection, see Aviam Soifer,
Speech, Secular  Sectarianism and Perilous  Neutrality (Tulsa, Okla., Nov. 1,  2002).
44.  Levinson, supra  n. 2,  at 183.
45.  Cf.  Sanford Levinson & J.M.  Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1597, 1631-34  (1991)  (on the temporal relativity of authenticity).
46.  See  Levinson, supra  n.  2,  at  95-96.  An eminent,  longtime  Harvard  political scientist, Samuel
Huntington  currently is  Albert  J. Weatherhead  III University  Professor  at Harvard,  Director  of the
John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, and Chairman  of the Harvard  Academy of International
and Area Studies.  See http://www.gov.harvard.edu/Faculty/Bios/Huntington.htm  (last updated  Jan. 14,
2003).
47.  See Levinson, supra n. 2,  at 5. Frances ("Fanny") Wright was "'an  Americanized Englishwoman
of  the  1820s."'  See  id.  at  5  (quoting  Werner  Sollors,  Beyond  Ethnicity:  Consent  and  Descent  in
American  Culture  152 (Oxford U.  Press  1986)).  She  was  a noted  commentator  on  American affairs,
and a political and social activist.  See Fanny  Wright, <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/REwright.
htm>  (last updated May 7, 2002).
48.  Levinson, supra n.  2, at 183.
49.  Levinson conceives of "signing"  the Constitution  as  "an  act of 'personal  ratification'  of what  is
presumptively embedded within it."  Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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community,"5°  and  the  Constitution  is  its  gospel.  So  to  be  renegade  from
constitutional  faith is to be not thickly American,  is to be a mere resident alien  in
this land-happy, no doubt, to accept the benefits  of being here but lacking "the
density  of felt  membership"5  in what  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  a  "political
order,
52 and a national "fellowship.,
5 3
As  American  political  anthropology,  this  is  entertainable.  In  Levinson's
hands, it is richly suggestive, informative, and stimulating.  As an account of what
makes Sandy sweat in Philadelphia, it has problems.
Levinson  sets  this  up,  in  effect,  as  a  syllogism.  Major premise: to  be
American  is to be someone who  can and does espouse  a certain  normative object
called  the  Constitution.  More  precisely,  to  know  oneself  as  American  is  to
discover, when occasion  demands, that one has it  in oneself to make the espousal.
Minor premise  (assumed):  Sandy  makes  it.  Sandy  has  it.  QED:  Sandy  is
American  (phew!).  That is a tale of self-discovery, or self-confirmation, and it can
work  as  such  only  if  Sandy  genuinely  finds  himself  in  doubt  about  his
Americanness at that moment  on the brink, when his signing or not hangs waiting
to be resolved.  Now, by Levinson's own testimony, Sandy has  never in his life felt
such  a  doubt!  "My  refusal  to  sign  the  Constitution,"  Levinson  reports,  "would
require  a much deeper  alienation  from American  life and  politics"-he  does not
say  "from  the  Constitution"-"than  I can  genuinely  feel  (or, indeed,  have  ever
felt). 54  Far from being determined  by his act of signing the Constitution, Sandy's
certainty  of  his  Americanness  is  what  determines  him  to  take  that  act.  The
certainty does not follow from the act but, to the contrary, precedes it.
So  suppose  we  invert  the  syllogism.  Major premise:  Sandy  is  firmly
American  and  knows  it.  Minor premise  (assumed):  Sandy  does  not  sign  the
Constitution.  QED: Being American, or knowing oneself as such,  is not only and
strictly  a  matter  of visitation  by  constitutional  faith.  What  would  follow  from
Sandy's not signing, we now see, is only that Sam Huntington's speculation  about
what makes a person American is off the mark.  Nothing will have been at stake,
during that moment  of waiting to  see whether Sandy  will or will not sign,  except
an  academic  theory  of  what  American  identity  is  or  consists  of.  Levinson
understands  this.  "If  we  answer  'no,"'  he  volunteers,  that  could  be  because
equating one's identity  as American  with one's  attachment  to the Constitution  is
not, after all, a very good "mode of political self-understanding." 5 5
B.  Back on Track: Faith, Judgment, Reason
But there  is something  more deeply wrong with  the self-discovery  tale  told
by the first syllogism.  That tale is, so to speak, one of justification  by faith and not
50.  Id. at 94.
51.  Id. at 181.
52.  Levinson, supra n. 2, at 181.
53.  Id. at 184
54.  Id. at 192.
55.  Id. at 181.
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by works or by reason.  It is one of election by grace and not by will or deed.  As
such, it is out of kilter with  a great deal else  in Constitutional  Faith, and, I daresay,
in Sanford Levinson.
In  the first place,  Levinson  simply  remains too much  the  liberal  to choose
faith  over  works,  or  grace  over  will.  For  him,  to  "sign"  the  Constitution-to
accept  the  Constitution  into  that  place  in  one's  life  that  one's  country's
constitution  is best  understood to occupy-plainly  is  to do something, not just to
show something.  It is to  modulate in some way  one's web of civic commitments
and obligations.  According  to Levinson,  the idea of consent  as the  key to  civic
obligation-notwithstanding  that it is  incorrigibly "theoretically  recalcitrant"-is
56 one of those "aspects  of the liberal  heritage"  worth respecting  as best one might.
So  when  Levinson  begins  his book  by  asking  what  "political  commitments"  an
immigrant  to the  United  States  assumes  by  taking  the  oath of allegiance  to  the
Constitution, 57 we may take him to use "commitment"  in the sense of "obligation."
When  he  demands  of  us  whether  we  would  have  signed  those  scrolls  in
Philadelphia,"  we  may  take  him  similarly  to  be  raising  with  us  the  question-
perhaps  among  others-of what  obligations  we  should  understand  ourselves  to
incur by doing so.
In  sum,  in  Levinson's  understanding,  attachment  to  the  Constitution  is  an
act, or a state resulting from an act, that imposes or implies obligation.  Could any
doubt remain, two  major themes  in Constitutional  Faith surely  would quell it: the
theme, as we may call it, of anti-nihilism and the theme of protestantism.
Repeatedly,  before  and  after  the  publication  of  Constitutional Faith, 59
Levinson  has  demurred  to  stances  of  "'radical  indeterminacy"'  regarding  legal
texts and legal reason.6°  His effort has  been to understand and clarify, for himself
and  others, how  one can "inhabit"  responsibly  a "practice  of [legal]  performance
after  innocence  has  been  lost"  regarding  the  strict,  prescriptive  determinacy  of
61 legal  texts  and  methods.  With  such  an  aim  in  view,  Levinson  must  and  does
reject  the claim  that  "any  result  is  possible  in any situation  ... ,62  He  objects
deeply to legal  arguments and judicial opinions  that seem to him to reflect such a
claim  by  their  bursting  of "the  bounds  of  reasonableness., 6 3   Yet  he  does  also
believe  those  bounds  to  be  quite  lax,  at  least  in  constitutional  cases  where  the
"ideological stakes" weigh heavily.
64
56.  Id. at 113.
57.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 3.
58.  See id. at 180.
59.  Most  recently  in Jack  M. Balkin  & Sanford  Levinson,  Legal Historicism and Legal Academics:
The Roles of Law Professors  in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 Geo. L.J. 173 (2001).  See e.g. Levinson &
Balkin, supra n.  45; Jordan Steiker, Sanford  Levinson  & J.M.  Balkin, Taking Text and Structure Really
Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and the  Crisis of Presidential  Eligibility, 74  Tex.  L.  Rev.  237
(1995);  Sanford  Levinson,  On Interpretation: The Adultery  Clause of the  Ten  Commandments, 58  S.
Cal. L. Rev. 719 (1985).
60.  Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 179.
61.  Levinson & Balkin, supra n. 45, at 1658.
62.  Balkin & Levinson, supra n. 59, at 179.
63.  Id. at 194.
64.  Id.  at 178-79.
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To  think,  Levinson  says  in  Constitutional Faith, that  agreement  on  any
corpus of "abstract words"  can  quiet serious political disputes-"the disputes that
required negotiation  in the first place"-is to  indulge in  a "dream"  of a language
immune  to "the  vagaries  of perspective  and  interpretation. ' " 6 5  "[T]he  South,"  he
says,  it seems without fear of contradiction, was  able to make  "cogent"  appeal  to
"the  same  Constitution  available  to Lincoln  . *...,66  Nevertheless,  holding such
views,  Levinson  stubbornly  resists-indeed,  rejects  as  "devastating"-the
"nihilist"  conclusion  that  the  Constitution  is  meaningless,  or  so  close  to
meaningless  as  to  be not  "worth  genuinely  grappling  with  as  a  potential  object
either of commitment or of rejection.,
6 7
So:  Our  man  denies  the  general  proposition  that  "any  result  is  possible  in
any situation."  Yet  he  affirms  that,  in  ideologically  loaded,  constitutional-legal
controversies,  it  will  virtually  always  be  possible  for  more  than  one  main
ideological  contender  to  produce  respectable  legal  arguments  for  its  favored
outcomes, among which  legal reason cannot  select objectively.6 8  True, that  is not
to  say  that  "any"  result  is  reachable;  there  remain  in  force  those  "bounds"  of
"reasonableness,"  lax  though  they  may  be.  Questions  obviously  remain  to  be
answered,  but it will  not be  our business  here  to answer  them.69  Right now, our
business  is  to  understand  why  claims  of  utter,  unbounded,  constitutional-legal
meaninglessness should bother Levinson one bit.
Suppose commitment to the Constitution matters in people's lives only as an
expression  of  faith  unreasoned  and  unchosen,  only  as  a  sign  of  election  or
membership.  In  that case,  meaninglessness  in the Constitution  obviously should
be no cause for worry.  (To the contrary, it would seem, the more meaningless the
better.)  For Levinson,  meaninglessness  is a threat because it erases the deed from
"attachment"  to  the  Constitution.  Subscription  to  a  meaningless  text  is nil.  It
leaves obligation  unaltered.  Over and  over, Levinson  wrestles with  the question
of  how  to  square  interpretative  plasticity  with  the  idea  that  fealty  to  the
Constitution binds anyone to anything.  The issue of whether the Constitution has
"real"  or "stable"  content  is crucial,  he says,  because, if it doesn't, then oaths to
support the Constitution  fail  to establish  any "vantage  point" by which  to  assess
the oathtakers'  "fidelity  to  their promises."7°  We would,  in  that  case,  be unable
"confidently  [to]  ascertain  when  someone  is  violating  the  commitment  to  be
65.  Levinson, supra  n. 2, at 125.
66.  Id. at 28.  Levinson  cites  Louis  Hartz,  The  Liberal Tradition in America: An  Interpretation of
American Political Thought Since the Revolution (Harcourt,  Brace &  Co. 1955).  Id. at 28,  202.  For
vigorous  and  dedicated  disagreement  that "the  South's"  constitutional arguments  could  stand  up  to
Lincoln's  for cogency, see Harry V. Jaffa, A  New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming
of the Civil War (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2000).
67.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 182.
68.  See  e.g. Balkin &  Levinson,  supra n.  59,  at  194 ("Most  cases  that appear  before  the  Supreme
Court could  go either way,  and  so  one's objections to court  decisions must,  in  the main, be  political
ones.").
69.  The  answers  lie  largely  in  the  "historicist"  view  of  legal  meaning,  developed  in  Balkin  &
Levinson, supra  n.  59.  See id. at 180-82.
70.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 121.
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bound  by  [the  Constitution's]  requirements."71  And  Levinson  plainly  does  want
attachment  to  the  Constitution  to  have  real,  obligatory  "'bite."'72  It's  for  that
reason, for example,  that he  distances  himself, at the last, from  the suggestion  by
Wendell  Willkie,  counsel  in  Schneiderman  v.  United  States, 73  that  the
Constitution's self-stipulated  openness to amendment trumps the idea that an oath
to  support  the  Constitution  commits  the  taker  to  any proposition  of substance
whatever, and that all you really swear to by such  an oath is your commitment  not
to try to change  the  Constitution  (but  why then  would  it matter?)  except  by the
procedures laid down by Article V.1
4
As an icon for the sort of constitutional-legal  nihilism that worries Levinson,
the  late  Chief  Justice  Fred  Vinson  seems  at  least  as  apt  as  Wendell  Willkie.
Upholding conviction  and  punishment  of a group  of American  Communists  for
conspiracy  to  "teach"  and  "advocate"  violent  destruction  of  the  United  States
government, Vinson attacked the suggestion  that the right of "speech"  guaranteed
by the  First Amendment  is or  possibly  could  be  "absolute."  Nothing  is  "more
certain in modern society,"  Vinson wrote, than
the  principle  that  there  are  no  absolutes,  that  a  name,  a  phrase,  a  standard  has
meaning  only  when  associated  with  the  considerations  which  gave  birth  to  the
nomenclature.  To  those  who  would  paralyze  our  Government  in  the  face  of
impending  threat  by  encasing  it  in  a  semantic  straitjacket  we  must  reply  that  all
concepts are relative.
75
As George Anastaplo later pointed out, that "'principle"'  is not one to which
men and women  "can pledge themselves,"  and therefore not one they can use in a
public process of forming themselves into a "'free People.' 7 6  Anastaplo evidently
believes that to be a sufficient ground for rejecting the principle, and so it appears
would Levinson.
C.  "Faith"  as Judgment
If the Constitution is the American  gospel, then Levinson  is adamantly for a
14  77 "protestant" view of the social organization of authority to construe the message.
A constitutional faith, he declares, is "idolatrous"  if it means suspension  of one's
"independent  evaluation"  of  the  tenets  of  the  faith.78  By  devoting  a  book  to
showing  all  the  room  there  is for doubt and  debate about exactly  what  it  is,  this
71.  Id. at 122.
72.  Id. at 148.
73.  320 U.S. 119 (1942).
74.  See Levinson, supra  n. 2, at 137-38, 148,  191.
75.  Dennis v. U.S.,  341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951)  (citation  omitted).
76.  George  Anastaplo,  Abraham  Lincoln: A  Constitutional  Biography 19  (Rowman  & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 1999).
77.  As  we have noticed,  Levinson's  approach  to constitutional  interpretation  also  has  a  "catholic"
side.  Levinson, supra n. 2, at 29 (describing as  "catholic"  the position that "the source of doctrine is the
text  of  the  Constitution  plus  unwritten  tradition"),  47  (endorsing  a  "Dworkinian"  model  of
constitutional interpretation,  in which "the  law is intertwined  with  the ordinary  moral understandings
of the given social order").
78.  Id. at 88.
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"Constitution"  to which  one  is invited  to add  one's  signature,  and  about  exactly
what one  would mean, or what  one would do,  by signing, Levinson  conveys that
these are matters that  each reader, in the end, must resolve for himself-albeit  in
legal spirit, with honest accountability to a "Word  (or Law)"  that is not entirely of
one's own, on-the-spot creation.79
In  the  end,  it  becomes  plain:  "faith"  for  Levinson  is  inseparable  from
judgment,  albeit  judgment  under  uncertainty.  When  Levinson  says  that  the
question  posed to visitors  by the Philadelphia exhibitors  is one  of faith, he  really
means the opposite.  He means  that "unthinking devotion"  to the Constitution  is
out of the question  for anyone  morally alert. 80  He means there  is nothing "built
into" the notion  of law to guarantee that this law will be "worthy of respect,
81  and
that, as a matter of fact, this law  obviously  has such  a morally clouded  past, 82  and
stands today  as such  a morally flawed instrument,83 that a choice  to endorse  it and
accordingly regulate one's conduct runs a  major risk of being wrong-not empty,
mind you, but wrong.
That  is much, but not quite  all, of what  I  think Levinson  is doing  with  the
notion  of constitutional  faith.  Additionally, there is the suggestion-and  isn't this
the  plausible  way,  really,  to  understand  Huntington  and  Wright?-that
Americans, as a matter of observed fact, show a remarkable  tractability regarding
the  merit  of  their  Constitution  and  its  suitability  to  them,  and  hence  are
remarkably ready to submit to laws and executions of laws that persuasively claim
the  Constitution  as  their  source  and  justification.  It  is  not  that  judging  the
Constitution favorably (or not) is what "makes"  someone American (or not).  It is
rather  that  those  who  are American  tend  in  fact  to  judge  the  Constitution
favorably.  The  cause  could  be  something  in  the  water  here.  More  likely,  it's
something in or about the Constitution combined with something in the American
experience or "mind"-caught, foreseen, or instigated by the framers, more power
to  them.  A  person  who judged  the  Constitution  unfavorably,  to the  point  of
"rejecting"  it, would seem  to be standing outside the American  mainstream.  But
that is not to say that what keeps insiders  inside is "faith,"  in the sternest religious
understanding  of  that  notion.  In  matters  concerning  civic  attachment  and
79.  See supra n. 14 and accompanying text.
80.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 54.
81.  Id. (emphasis omitted).
82.  Chattel  slavery,  he  says,  and by extension  race,  "is  surely the most difficult  problem  presented
[to] those who would celebrate the Constitution . I..."  Id. at 186-87.
83.  "[W]hat  reason,"  he  asks,  "do  persons  mired  in  poverty  have  to  be  wildly  appreciative  of
negative rights...?  Should a homeless  resident of Philadelphia, whose  interest in the Second Bank of
the  United States  might be primarily  as a shelter from the storm, necessarily sign any extant version of
the  Constitution?"  Id. at  190.  Levinson  suggests that  the present  system is seriously  flawed in  other
respects,  referring  to  a  widely  noted  report  by  a  group  of eminent  citizens  calling  themselves  the
Commission  on  the  Constitutional  System.  See  id.;  Comm.  on  the  Constitutional  System,  A
Bicentennial Analysis  of  the  American  Political Structure:  Report  and  Recommendations of  the
Committee on the  Constitutional  System  (1987)  (twenty page  report  and  recommendations).  For  an
account  of  some  of  the  Commission's  views,  see  Lloyd  N.  Cutler,  Political Parties  and Workable
Government, in A  Workable Government?  The  Constitution after 200 Years 49  (Burke Marshall  ed.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1987).
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obligation,  Levinson  will have  none  of that.  What  he  demands  of us  there,  on
moral grounds, is reasoned,  reflective choice.
III.  WHY A "CATHOLIC"  CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACT  IS UNLIKELY
A  major point in Levinson's  teaching,  I have  said,  is that a  reasoned  choice
to  endorse  the  Constitution,  and  accordingly  regulate  one's  conduct,  runs  a
genuine risk of being wrong.  Among the most important dimensions of conduct to
be  regulated,  I  have  suggested,84  is  acceptance  and  general  support  of  the
government's  disposition  to  demand  everyone's  compliance  with  all
constitutionally enacted  laws and legal interpretations,  including the ones that are
not at  all  nice  in your  eyes or  in  mine,  and  to back  its demands  by force  where
needed.  How  far  any  of us  buys  into that  dimension  of civic  obligation,  I have
suggested,  must  probably  depend  on  the  margins  (they  might  be  negative)  by
which  we  severally  judge  or  assume  the  overall  practice  of government  in  our
country to be, on the whole, respect-worthy.
I now  can  state  with  considerable  precision  the  question  on  which  I  seek
light  from  Levinson.  Suppose  we  make  a  very  optimistic  assumption  along  the
lines  of that  empirical  observation  I  have just  been  describing,  that  Americans
tend  strongly  to  cotton  to  the  Constitution.  Suppose  we  assume  that  everyone
alive today  in United States territory has  gone on pilgrimage  to Philadelphia  and
signed  up.  Have we,  then, achieved  a  virtual  social  contract  to treat the  overall
system  as respect-worthy-and  each  law  issuing  from  it,  therefore,  as justifiably
enforceable  against everyone-for  as  long  as  the  frequency  of  unconstitutional
law-making, or law-interpretation,  remains below some threshold of tolerance?
I  have  argued  elsewhere  that the  answer  cannot  easily be "yes"  for  anyone
who  looks  at matters from what we  now  may call a  "catholic"  standpoint. 85  That
argument can briefly, if crudely, be summarized as follows:
(1)  The "contract"  we  have  under consideration  is one that would bind  the
contractors to support coercion against others and accept it against themselves.
(2) We stipulate that no one can accept such an obligation rationally, or with
due responsibility  to others and to the self, without first having judged for herself,
independently, that the terms of agreement  really  are such that everyone who  will
be bound by these  terms has  good enough  reasons (of theirs, not just of ours)  to
accept  the terms-that  being what it  is, in a liberal  view, for a constituted system
of government  to be respect-worthy.86
84.  See infra pt. 11.
85.  See  Michelman,  supra  n.  4,  at  pt.  V(c);  Frank  I.  Michelman,  Constitutional Legitimation for
Political  Acts,  66 Modern L. Rev. 1 (2003).
86.  See John  Rawls, Political  Liberalism 139-40 (Columbia  U. Press 1993)  ("[S]ince  political power
is  the coercive  power  of  ...  citizens  as a  corporate  body, this  power  should  be exercised  ...  only in
ways  that  all  citizens  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  endorse  in  the light  of  their  common  human
reason.").  See  Michelman,  supra n.  4,  at  pt. IV(B)  ("When  we  conclude,  in  the  teeth  of  another's
protest, that it is morally okay for  us to join in mobilization  of compulsion against  that other to comply
with  a  given law,  we feel it  is incumbent on  us to be able to  give reasons  that she has-that everyone
has-to  accept  this  as  the  general  social  practice.").  Because  (2)  is  a  stipulation  with  which  not
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(3)  No one  can  make such  a judgment  without knowing  what the  terms of
agreement relevantly are.
(4)  Think of the Constitution  prior to or apart from the accumulated  set of
the  Supreme  Court's  interpretive  rulings.  Whether  one  conceives  of  this  un-
interpreted  Constitution  as  text  alone or  ("catholically")  as text-plus,87  its terms
are relatively open  and abstract  and  a great many  of its major applications  fairly
debatable.  The  text-plus,  after  all,  is  still  rooted  in  language,  and  Levinson
reminds us of "how  unlikely  it is that presumed agreement on  the importance  of
abstract  words  will in  fact  still  the  disputes that required  negotiation  in the  first
place. 88   Now  think  about  a  person  "catholically"  disposed  to  equate  the
Constitution's  meanings-in-application  with  whatever  the  Supreme  Court rules.
She  is  trying to  decide  whether  to  sign.  Can  she  possibly-rationally-decide
without waiting forever to see how the Supreme Court will rule?  Only the Court's
relatively concrete decisions,  and not the un-interpreted  text or text-plus, can  tell
her what the deal  is regarding  such questions as:  which governmental  department
or branch decides a contested election of presidential electors; 89 which decides  the
scope  of  legal  protections  for  women 9°  or  the  disabled;91  if  the  unborn  are
constitutionally  protected  from  harm;9 2  if convicts  may  be  put  to death  by  the
state;9 3 if devotion of public revenues to private or religious education is allowed;94
if regulatory  control  of spending  in elections  is  allowed;95 if affirmative  action  is
allowed;96  if  homelessness  and  starvation  are  allowed;9 7  how  far  private  hate
speech  may  be  regulated;98  how  far  liberty  may  be  sacrificed  to  security  (or
security to liberty) in times of national danger; and so on.
(5)  If we try to avoid the problem by saying that the complete constitutional
contract  consists  of  the  text  or  text-plus  together  with  the  up-to-the-minute
complete  series of United States Reports, will  that be something  you  or I can  say
confidently must be deemed respect-worthy  by every reasonable American?
(6)  If, alternatively,  we  try to avoid the problem by falling back on the text
or the  text-plus  as the  set of terms for a  system  of government  on  which  we  can
count  for  every  reasonable  American's  agreement,  is  there  enough  information
everyone  may  agree, the argument  in  the essays cited  in supra note 85  is  expressly presented  as one
that holds only for those who do agree with it.
87.  See supra pt. I(A).
88.  Levinson, supra n. 2, at 125.
89.  See Bush v. Gore,  531  U.S. 98 (2000).
90.  See  U.S. v. Morrison,  529 U.S. 598  (2000).
91.  See Bd. of Trustees of U. of Ala. v. Garrett,  531 U.S. 356 (2001).
92.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93.  See e.g. Gregg v.  Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
94.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,  122 S.  Ct. 2460 (2002).
95.  See Buckley v.  Valeo, 424 U.S.  1 (1976).
96.  See Adarand Constructors,  Inc. v.  Pena,  515 U.S. 200 (1995).
97.  See e.g. Dandridge  v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
98.  R.A. V.  v.  City of St. Paul,  505  U.S. 377 (1992).
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there  about  what  the  deal  is,  to  make  it  reasonable  to  demand  everyone's
authorization  of coercion on the basis only of that?99
For present  purposes, it  does not  matter whether you  accept  this argument
as  finally  conclusive  against  the  idea  of a  "catholic"  constitutional  contract,  but
only that you catch its drift.  Assuming everyone is "catholic,"  an obvious dilemma
plagues the case for  a constructive constitutional  contract.  A contract  containing
the Supreme  Court's rulings as terms could be too "thick" to be  a plausible object
of universal  free  acceptance,  but a  contract  comprised  only  of the  constitutional
text  or  text-plus  could  be  too  "thin"-too  short  of  complete  or  adequately
informative-to  bear the weight of justification of civic coercion.
IV.  TOWARDS  A PROTESTANT CONSTITUTIONAL  CONTRACT?
If everyone  is assumed  "protestant,"  the  last-mentioned  dilemma seems  to
disappear.  Among protestants-and  this would seem especially true of Levinson-
style  "catholic-protestants"1  -the  Constitution  quite  easily  can  be  imagined
agreeable  at every moment to everyone.  Everyone, after all, is expected to arrive
at his or her own determinations of what the Constitution  truly says and requires,
by application  of morally informed reason to a rich and varied array of sources.
But this, I expect  you will say, is craziness.  Among protestants, you will  say,
the  claim  of  a  constructive  constitutional  contract  never  gets  off  the  ground
because  there  is no  "meeting  of the  minds."  The  Constitution  is  the Peerless. 1 0
You  have  yours  in  mind,  and  I  have  mine, and  how  shall  the  twain  meet?  A
protestant-style  constructive  constitutional  contract  is an  idea doomed  from  the
start.  Are you sure?  Would Sanford Levinson  agree?  Let us see.
Some  time back, we left  Levinson  locked  in a struggle  to find some place of
repose  between  his  concern  that attachment  to  the  Constitution  might  lack any
real,  obligatory  "bite"  and  his  belief in  the  substantial  prescriptive  plasticity  of
constitutional-legal  materials.  As Levinson points out, it does not follow from that
plasticity that the Constitution and constitutional  law are not constantly presiding
over American  politics,  in  a  very  real  way.  "Constitution-talk,"  says  Levinson,
provides a distinctive American vocabulary for debates over major issues of public
policy.  It  supplies  a  grid  of  "'common  language"'  for  use  when  Americans
collectively  choose  to  process  verbally,  and  not  by  other  means,  their
disagreements about "'the distribution and use of power in our society."'"" 2  In that
sense,  the  Constitution  is constantly,  so to  speak,  on  duty.  But if-as Levinson
also says-the linguistic system that  the Constitution  undoubtedly does constitute
is so supple, so "'indeterminate,"'' 03 that one can use  it to take any side on  "[any]
99.  See  Frank  1.  Michelman,  The  Problem  of  Constitutional Interpretive  Disagreement: Can
"Discourses of Application"  Help?,  in  Habermas and Pragmatism 113  (Mitchell  Aboulafia,  Myra
Bookman & Catherine  Kemp eds., Routledge 2002).
100.  See supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
101.  See Raffles v.  Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
102.  Levinson, supra  n.  2, at 191  (quoting H. Jefferson Powell, What the Constitution Means for Your
Town, and for You, Des Moines Register  13a (Dec. 18, 1986)).
103.  Id. (Levinson's scare-quotes).
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important political issue  imaginable"-if nothing  is "unsayable"  in that language,
nothing securely  "'off-the-wall""° 4-then  why should  anyone  sweat the oath that
commits them to nothing except use of this all-but-infinitely plastic language?
The plasticity of the constitutional  language  turns out to be its saving grace.
Sandy can sign, as he wants to, without committing himself to any conversational
"closure,"1 ° 5  which he doesn't want to, and yet also without committing  himself to
nothing,  which  he  also  doesn't  want  to.  By  signing,  he  commits  himself  to
something  important,  that  being  respect  and  support  for  this  very  political-
conversational  non-closure!  Linguistic plasticity becomes the kernel of a political
and  social  system  to  which  one  indeed  can  make  a  heart-felt  commitment,
incurring thereby  a  true obligation:  to "tak[e]  political conversation  seriously."'
0 6
The Constitution,  in  effect,  is reduced  to  that  one  principle  of obligation,  which
entails both supporting such conversations and supporting the use of the powers of
government  to maintain  them.07  Now, this is hardly nothing.  It  is one  version-
the closing  version,  one might say-of the  new-world "proposition"  that Lincoln
said  the  Union  armies  fought to  save:  government  by the  people,  conducted  by
ballots, not bullets.08
So  have  we here-could  it be?-a happy ending?0 9  Levinson  does end  up
getting  two things at once, both of which  he values very highly, that it's not at all
obvious how to put together: commitment to a national joint political venture  and
retention of moral independence  (non-"closure").  Why,  then, does  Sandy sweat?
The way I see it, he doesn't in fact sweat over signing, once he's got the question of
what he's signing  satisfactorily  sorted  out.  It is  the  sorting-out-the  shaping  of
constitutional-legal  obligation  into that  one, democratic proposition-that  causes
the sweat.
May  we  read  this,  then,  as  Levinson's  proposal  for  a  "protestant"
constitutional  contract?  One that  would oblige every  "signer"  to accept  without
grievance  enforcement  of whatever  laws  and legal  interpretations  emanate  from
"the  system,"  as  long  as  the  principle  of robustly  democratic,  "conversational"
decisionmaking  remains substantially  unmolested at the system's heart?  Couldn't
everyone in sight-at least everyone who understands  and  accepts both the need
104.  Id. at 191-92.
105.  Id. at 193.
106.  Id.  Compare Mark Tushnet,  Taking the Constitution Away from  the  Courts 14  (Princeton  U.
Press  1999)  ("The...  principles  [of the Declaration  of  Independence]  define  our  fundamental  law.
Vigorous disagreement over what those principles  mean for any specific problem of public policy does
not  mean  that  we  as  a  society  have  no  fundamental  law  in  common.")  For  Levinson's  subsequent
endorsement of Tushnet's view, see Balkin & Levinson, supra  n.  59, at 178.
107.  See Levinson, supra n. 2, at 193.
108.  The  Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln vol.  7,  at  23  (Roy  B.  Basler  ed.,  Rutgers  U. Press
1953)  (Gettysburg  Address)  (compare  the first  and  last sentences);  The Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln vol.  4,  at 439  (Roy  B.  Basler  ed.,  Rutgers  U.  Press  1953)  (Message  to Congress  in  Special
Session, July 4,  1861).  For persuasive  reduction  to one  proposition  of what may  look like three-all
men created equal, government by the people, ballots  not bullets-along with persuasive  imputation of
the reduction  to Lincoln, see Jaffa, supra n. 66, at passim.
109.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Sanford  Levinson, Introduction:  Constitutional  Conversations,  in
Constitutional  Stupidities, Constitutional  Tragedies 1, 8  (William  N. Eskridge, Jr.,  & Sanford  Levinson
eds., N.Y. U. Press 1998).
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for government by law and the created-equal  status of all of humankind-be  fairly
called  upon to sign on to that Constitution,  that "proposition?"  How could signing
on to  it  compromise  independence  of anyone's  moral  or  legal judgment?  True,
the proposition  would commit you  to respect  the laws found fit for  your country
by  its  people  acting  collectively,  through  procedures  in  which  you  could  be
outvoted.  But you  would be  bound  only  insofar as you continued  to judge that
these  collective  actions  have occurred through certain  processes,  in certain  social
conditions,  under  certain  rules  and  guarantees  (a  bill  of  rights)-all  of  these
standards  existing  independently  of you  (as  "the  Word  (or Law)")" ° but  being
construed by you  in  such  a way  as to  add  up, in  your eyes, to  a  true practice  of
democracy.
A  court  might  reject  as  "illusory"  a  contract  based  on  such  a  promise. '
Even so, such  a promise  maybe too much  for anyone  truly "protestant"  to make,
and  for  that  we  have  the  word  of  Sanford  Levinson.  "[E]ven  my  'best'
Constitution  might  at  times  come  into conflict  with  what  I  regard  as  my  most
important  moral  commitments,"  Levinson  writes  at  the  end  of  Constitutional
Faith, and  then  "it  would  be  the  Constitution  that  (I  hope)  would  give way."'
112
May  we perceive  there the workings  of a  thought closely  akin to  one that others
often have expressed  by denying that democracy  trumps justice, and denying also
that justice  either is reducible  to  democracy  or fully derivable  from  it?"3  If you
buy  that denial-and  it  seems  Levinson  does-then  neither  a  "catholic"  nor  a
"protestant"  constitutional contract  is going to seem a very plausible idea.
110.  Levinson, supra n. 2,  at 25; see text accompanying supra note 14.
1ll.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts  § 2 cmt. e (1981).
112.  Levinson, supra n. 2,  at 193.
113.  See e.g. James E. Fleming, Constructing  the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993).
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